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Recent Developments

Television: The Public Interest in License Renewals

In January 1970 the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) released
a policy statement concerning comparative hearings on renewal applications
for radio and television broadcasting licenses.1 This policy statement, which
was a response to the license renewal controversy generated by WHDH,
Inc.,2 makes substantial changes for renewal applicants in two areas: (1)
the administrative process used to decide between competing applicants, and
(2) the criteria used as a basis for that decision.
Prior to the 1970 Policy Statement, the FCC provided a procedure
whereby a challenger could compete for a station's license at renewal. In
that procedure a comparative hearing was scheduled and the FCC's subsequent decision was based on an evaluation of criteria and standards which had
evolved over many years.
Although in the 1970 Policy Statement the FCC recognizes the statutory
right of the public to challenge at renewal,8 the renewal process is no longer
competitive. The policy announced by the FCC in the 1970 statement divides the renewal hearing into two stages. At the first stage, the past performance of the renewal applicant is examined. If the renewal applicant
"shows . . .that its program service during the preceding license term has
been substantially attuned to meeting the needs and interests of its area and
that the operation of the station has not otherwise been characterized by serious deficiencies . . . his application for renewal will be granted." 4 The renewal hearing will proceed to the second stage, i.e., the comparative hearing,
1. FCC

PUBLIC NOTICE,

Jan. 15, 1970 (FCC 70-62) [hereinafter cited as 1970

Policy -Statement]. The 1970 Policy Statement is also the subject of a staff study

released after this article was written. STAFF OF THE SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 91ST CONG., 2d
SESS., ANALYSIS OF FCC's 1970 POLICY STATEMENT ON COMPARATIVE HEARINGS INVOLVING REGULAR RENEWAL APPLICANTS (Subcomm. Print 1970). This article reaches

some of the same conclusions as the staff study.

2. 16 F.C.C.2d 1 (1969), affd, Civil No. 17,785 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 13, 1970).

3. 47 U.S.C. §§ 307-09 (1964). See also 1970 Policy Statement 1.
4. Id. at 2.
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only when the renewal applicant fails to show "adequate" 5 past performance.
The license renewal controversy centers on the relationship of the FCC's
regulatory authority and the concept of public interest. This article will

evaluate the 1970 Policy Statement in relation to prior case law, the statutory means offered and available for FCC policy enforcement, and the
public goals desirable in television broadcasting to determine whether this
policy constitutes a breach of FCC authority. 6 As an alternative to the
1970 Policy Statement, the article proposes the proper public interest goal
for television broadcasting and its effective implementation within the boun-

daries of the FCC's regulatory authority.
Statutory guidelines limit the FCC's discretion and require that the
"Commission shall determine, in the case of each application filed . . .
whether the public interest, convenience, and necessity will be served by the
granting of such application .

. .

."I

Therefore, an examination of the

FCC's statutory authority and its implementation is warranted.
The FCC's Statutory Authority

In the early days of radio it was recognized that frequency disturbances
would necessitate technical control of the available spectrum allocations. 8
5. The effect of the 1970 Policy Statement is to divide the renewal hearing into two
stages. By an initial determination whether the licensee's past performance has been
"substantially attuned," the FCC removes the opportunity for challengers to be heard.
Therefore, there is no guarantee that the challenger will be able to show that he is
better qualified. The statutory scheme provides an opportunity "for new parties to
demonstrate in public hearings that they will better serve the public interest." Id.
at 1. Since the policy statement would grant renewal to the incumbent licensee without
a comparative hearing in many cases, it contradicts the statutory purpose to insure
the public interest.
6. This article will focus exclusively on licensing of the television broadcast industry. The establishment of standards for judging renewal applications must respond to
the relevant problems of the particular communication media involved. The FCC has
recognized distinctions between regulating the television and radio industries by
promulgating special rules and regulations applicable only to network programming of
television shows. The regulation of television also differs substantially from radio in
(1) the frequency space allocated to commercial television broadcasting is twenty times
that of commercial radio broadcasting, (2) the costs of licenses and facilities for television operation is much greater than those for radio, and (3) the services and programming provided by television are entirely different in character than those provided
by radio. For a further discussion of the applicability of standards at renewal both
television and radio licenses, see Renewal of Standard Broadcast Licenses [Broadcasting
in America and the FCC's License Renewal Process: An Oklahoma Case Study], 14
F.C.C.2d 1 (1968) [hereinafter cited as An Oklahoma Case Study]. For statistical
information on broadcast operations, see 35 FCC ANN. REP. 113-219 (1969).
7. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1964).
8. 68 CONG. REc. 3027 (1927) (remarks of Senator Dill). "I submit that
[there] . . . is in itself no reason for refusing to relieve a situation that is fast making
the millions of radio sets in this country useless and worthless because of the interference on the air."
The transmission of radio waves is physically possible only within a specific range of
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The unlimited possibilties of technical development in communications and
their wide-ranging effect on the democratic system caused Congress to predicate the FCC's regulatory authority on the public interest. 9 The framework of this authority is structured with an insistence on public ownership
with limited terms for licenses. 10 The statutory standard of conduct, i.e.,
"the public interest, convenience and necessity," provided the FCC with an
affirmative command and the necessary discretion to regulate future developments in communications."
The Communications Act of 193412 was enacted to enforce the goal of
service in the public interest. The Act provided three occasions at which the
frequencies called the radio spectrum. This spectrum is divided into separate bands
used by different services, i.e., radio, television, radar, etc. Each band is limited in
frequency. Frequency is measured in megacycles per second, or more commonly,
megaHertz. These two terms are synonymous and equal 1 million cycles per second.
The television band for channels 7 through 13 is from 174 to 216 megaHertz. Technical standards require that the space used by one television channel be six megaHertz.
Therefore, the band from 174 to 216 megaHertz is limited to seven television stations.
Likewise, the radio and radar bands are limited. Unless some control is exercised interference is bound to occur with the increasing number of stations.
9. 47 U.S.C. § 307-08 (1964). When Congress established a regulatory scheme
with public ownership, a limited license period, and a general standard of performance,
some members expressed consideration for the broadcaster's first amendment rights, the
limited availability of licenses within a private competitive system, the public's right to
some minimum standard in program performance, and the seemingly unlimited potential
of the industry itself. See Hearings on S. 2910 Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1934). The
Supreme Court has commented that "this criterion is as concrete as the complicated
factors for judgment in such a field of delegated authority permit, it serves as a
supple instrument for the exercise of discretion by the expert body which Congress
has charged to carry out its legislative policy." FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co.,
309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940).
Its usefulness as an expression of congressional policy, however, has been questioned
by responsible critics. Professor Jaffe has commented that "there has never been a
statutory policy. The FCC was simply told to go ahead and regulate in the 'public interest.'" Jaffe, Book Review, 65 YALE L.J. 1068, 1073 (1956). Judge Friendly takes
the view that the use of the dummy standard in organizing most of the administrative agencies has actually been quite harmful in the development of positive regulatory
functions within the agencies. Friendly, The Administrative Agencies, 77 HARV. L.
REV.

1058 (1964).

10. 47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1964).
11. "The standard of action established by this chapter is that public interest, convenience, and necessity must be served and within that framework the Commission is
free to exercise its expert judgment, but . . . it must proceed within the scope of authority granted to it." WOKO, Inc. v. FCC, 153 F.2d 623 (D.C. Cir. 1946), rev'd on
other grounds, 329 U.S. 223 (1946). "The requirement that the Commission, in granting
licenses, act as the public convenience, interest, or necessity require, does not confer an
unlimited power, but is to be interpreted by its context, by the nature of radio transmission and reception, by the scope, character and quality of services." Yankee Network v. FCC, 107 F.2d 212 (D.C. Cir. 1939). "In reviewing decisions of the Commission the Court is limited to questions affecting Constitutional power, statutory authority and basic prerequisites of proof." American Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 179
F.2d 437 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
12. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609
(1964).
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FCC could review station applicants and performance standards: (1) at
initial application,13 (2) transfer, 14 and (3) renewal. 15 By providing for
open competition at each of these times, the Act's purpose of public ownership was re-emphasized.' 0 Competition also aided the FCC's search for
performance standards to regulate the issuance of broadcasting licenses.
Today, however, there are no longer three times at which service in the
public interest can be reviewed by a competitive process. Review at initial
application has been considerably limited because of the restricted availability
of VHF-UHF television frequencies. 1 7 Competitive review at transfer was
terminated by a 1952 amendment to the Act.' 8 The only time at which a
broadcaster's performance in the public interest can be reviewed is at renewal.
Therefore, the history of FCC renewal policy from Hearst Radio, Inc.
(WBAL), 19 through WHDH, Inc.,'20 to the 1970 Policy Statement must be
examined.
The WBAL Policy

The FCC's policy regarding license renewals was first firmly etablished in
WBAL. In WBAL the FCC favored renewal when the licensee's operation
had been "meritorious," although comparatively the challenging applicant
had gained preferences. 2' The decision implicitly recognized that policy
considerations make it "difficult. . .for a newcomer to make the comparative showing necessary to displace an established licensee."'22 Thus, while
the FCC continued to weigh the merits of the challenger's application at renewal in light of comparative factors, the past performance of the existing
licensee merited weighted consideration.
13. 47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1964).
14. Id.

15. 47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1964).
16. Id. §§ 307-09.
17. Television stations assigned TV channels 2 through 13 are known as VHF
(very high frequency) TV stations. Television stations assigned TV channels 14
through 83 are known as UHF (ultra high frequency) TV stations. Statistics made
available by the FCC show that the number of commercial VHF and UHF television
stations in operation or presently available in the top 100 markets are as follows:
Channels
Channels
Channels on the Air, Authorized
Market
Available
Or Applied For
Allocated
Areas
VHF UHF
VHF
UHF
VHF UHF
45
0
0
45
40
Top 10
40
26
138
0
164
157
Top 50
157
81
217
0
264
Top 100
264 298
35 FCC ANN. REP. 198-200 (1969).
18. Act of July 16, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-554, § 5, 66 Stat. 711, 716, amending,
47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (1946) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (1964)).
19. 15 F.C.C. 1149 (1951).
20. 16 F.C.C.2d 1 (1969).
21. 15 F.C.C. 1178 (1951).
22. WHDH,Inc., 16 F.C.C.2d 1 (1969).
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The policy announced in WBAL substantially removed 23 the renewal applicant from the comparative process. Since a considerable preference
was established in the evaluation of the existing licensee's past performance,
severe limitations were placed on the weight accorded other criteria as evi-

dentiary factors. 24 Although these criteria were considered within the comparative process, the established preference shifted the burden of discrediting
the licensee's past performance to the challenger, rather than requiring the
existing licensee to compete on all the merits for the public's property.
The WBAL policy severely limited the regulatory function of the FCC at

renewal and adversely affected the number of prospective challengers willing to invest the substantial funds required to contest renewal. Since renewal
challenges were few and ineffective, 25 the FCC itself incurred the primary
burden of checking the licensee's performance. 2 6 This policy was followed
until the WHDH decision in 1969.27
23. WBAL did not limit other criteria to a separate evaluation. It simply weighed
the past performance of the licensee in such a manner that the value of other criteria
was effectively negated.
24. The reasoning behind the FCC's policy of strongly favoring the existing licensee's past performance at renewal seems to have been formulated from two principal
considerations: (1) that the past broadcast record was the best available criteria to
judge future performance and (2) that industry investment in broadcast facilities represented a legitimate reliance factor which should not be disturbed without reason.
25. "The following table shows the number of renewal applications for radio and
television stations set for hearing by the FCC in each fiscal year:
1958-2
1962-13
1966-16
1959-3
1963-13
1967-6
1960-21
1964-8
1968-15
1961-5
1965-16
Most of the applications were designated for hearing because of evidence of misrepresentation."
Comment, The Aftermath of WHDH: Regulation by Competition or
Protection of Mediocrity?, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 368, 371 n.21 (1970).

26. 47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1964) gives the FCC the responsibility of reviewing licensee performance and insuring compliance with its public interest standard. There are,
however, over 7,500 radio and television stations all of which are licensed for a threeyear period. To accomplish the review of station performance required by the statute
at renewal, the FCC designates every two months a geographical block of licenses
which are presented for consideration by the FCC staff. Commissioners Cox and
Johnson have commented on this procedure:
The Commission staff, acting on delegated authority, routinely grants all the
renewal applications except for those few whose draftsmen were inexperienced
and hence made technical mistakes in filling them out. Engineering and financial deficiencies revealed by the applications, survey deficiencies, high commercial levels, and certain unresolved complaints are also causes for delaying a
grant. But programming deficiencies, even the most flagrant indifference to
the local service obligation imposed by the Communications Act, raise no
eyebrows.
An Oklahoma Case Study 9. The process for review is primarily the renewal branch's
responsibility. Shortages in personnel, and funding limitations severely restrict any
possible review.
27. 16 F.C.C.2d 1 (1969).
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The WHDH Policy
In WHDH the FCC rejected the WBAL policy.2 8 In reversing the exami-

ner's determination the FCC stated that:
In our judgment, the Examiner's approach to this proceeding
places an extraordinary and improper burden upon new applicants
who wish to demonstrate that their proposals, when considered on a
29
comparative basis, would better serve the public interest.
In recognizing that the WBAL policy had considerably limited the effective
regulatory function of the license renewal proceeding, the FCC advocated

"a different approach . . . when [the examiners] considered a past broad30

cast record."
In WHDH the FCC applied the guidelines set forth in its 1965 Policy
Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings for Initial Applications 31 to
renewal proceedings. Under the WHDH policy the renewal applicant's past
record will be disregarded if it is "within the bounds of average performance." ' 32 If the renewal applicant's past record is within these bounds, then
28. Id. For a thorough treatment of WHDH see Comment, The Aftermath of
WHDH: Regulation by Competition or Protection of Mediocrity?, 118 U. PA. L. REV.
368 (1970). See also Goldin, "Spare the Golden Goose"-The Aftermath of WHDH
in FCC License Renewal Policy, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1014 (1970).
Professor Goldin
argues that WHDH is regarded by the FCC as a special case which does not reflect a
change in policy. Whether WHDH is a special case or an announcement of a new
policy is not relevant to this article. Its relevance is that it created much controversy
in the broadcasting industry and Congress and was a motivating force for the 1970
Policy Statement. Professor Jaffe has attacked WHDH stating "that WHDH could
mean that all licenses are now at hazard every three years, a proposition which would
work a revolution in the industry and cause serious problems of financing." Jaffe,
WHDH: The FCC and Broadcasting License Renewals, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1700
(1969).
Many factors including the profits in the television industry indicate that
this "revolution" is not proved. See notes 61-65 infra and accompanying text.
29. 16 F.C.C.2d 1, 9 (1969).
30. Id. at 10.
31. 1 F.C.C.2d 393 (1965) [hereinafter cited as 1965 Policy Statement].
The
1965 Policy Statement identified the criteria applicable to persons competing at initial
applications. Two primary goals, i.e., the best practical service and diversification in
the media, were recognized. Past programming criteria, such as integration of management and ownership, would be measured as evidentiary material in attaining the goals
stated. In Seven (7) League Productions, Inc. (WIll), 1 F.C.C.2d 1597 (1965), the
FCC first gave notice that the 1965 Policy Statement would serve as the basis for the
introduction of evidence in renewal cases.
32. 16 F.C.C.2d 1, 9 (1969).
Since the ultimate objective of the comparative hearing is to determine which
applicant can best serve the public interest and since all applicants who are
in the running can presumably provide satisfactory performance, a renewal
applicant's record indicates he can better serve the public interest only if it is
substantially above the level of performance which the Commission regards
as satisfactory. Any challenger who is below this level will presumably be
eliminated.
Comment, The Aftermath of WHDH: Regulation by Competition or Protection of
Mediocrity?, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 368, 384 (1970).
"What was applicable in WHDH
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he will be evaluated on other comparative factors with no preference given to
his past record.
The FCC believed that this approach did not leave the new applicants competing at a disadvantage.
More importantly, the public interest is better served where the
foundation for determining the best practicable service as between
a renewal
and a new applicant, are more nearly equal at their out33
set.
The WHDH decision, therefore, changed renewal policy from an examination
primarily of past performance to a competitive process which evaluates past
performance equally with other criteria. This change caused considerable
controversy in the broadcasting industry and motivated the FCC to issue the
34
1970 Policy Statement.
The 1970 Policy Statement
The 1970 Policy Statement offers a different method for evaluating renewal
applicants than that proposed in either WBAL or WHDH. This method
replaced the competitive and regulatory structure of the statutory scheme by
an administrative determination of the public interest.
The 1970 Policy Statement "calls for the balancing of two . . .considerations" to insure that the public interest standard is served.
The first [consideration] is that the public receive the benefits of
the [statute] . . . inherent in the fact that there can be a challenge
... . The second is that the comparative hearing policy in this
area must3 5not undermine predictability and stability of broadcast
operation.
The Communications Act requires that the FCC allow challenges to the existing licensee in renewal proceedings.86 The right to challenge renewal must
was the basic principle . . . that the renewal applicant cannot be accorded an unfair
advantage because of the mere fact of his prior operation of the station." Id. at 386.
33. 16 F.C.C.2d 1, 10 (1969).
34. "There has, however, been considerable controversy on this issue, as shown by

the hearings on S. 2004 now going forward before the Senate Subcommittee on Communications. Issuance of this statement will therefore contribute to clarity of our
policies in this important area."

1970 Policy Statement 1.

35. Id. at 2.
36. The Supreme Court in Ashbacher Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945)
compelled the FCC to use the comparative hearing process. The Court stated that
"[i]t is thus plain that § 309(a) not only gives the Commission authority to grant
licenses without a hearing, but also gives applicants a right to a hearing before their
applications are denied." Id. at 332. Although Section 309(a) has been amended,
the provision substituted is essentially the same as the Court considered in Ashbacher
and would seem to require giving both applicants a comparative hearing at renewal.
The 1970 Policy Statement by first determining whether there has been substantial
past performance, dismisses the comparative process at renewal since there is no guarantee that the challenger will reach the second stage of the proceeding.
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be read as part of the framework of the FCC's authority . 7 Since the framework of that authority is based on public ownership with limited license
terms, the Act provides that the grant of the license is for the term only, and
that the license can not be "construed to create any right, beyond the terms,
conditions, and periods of the license."3 8s The Act also specifies that renewal
applicants sign "a waiver of any claim to the use of any particular frequency" that may be based on the "previous use of the same [frequency]."' 39
However, by first determining whether past performance has been "substantially attuned, '40 the FCC recognizes rights beyond its statutory authority.
Apparently, the FCC believes that the license creates rights of stability and
continuity within the existing licensee that extend beyond the statutory term.
The FCC has failed to show that this stability and continuity is necessary in
the television broadcasting industry. Even if such necessity were shown, it
could not justify a breach of the FCC's statutory authority.
In breaching its statutory authority, the FCC has not changed the evidentiary value of competitive criteria, but has evaluated these criteria administratively or dismissed them from consideration. 41 These three criteria, (1)
diversification, (2) owner-management integration, and (3) program proposals, must be considered competitively to determine which applicant would
"better" serve the public interest.
The first of these criteria, diversification, was examined by the FCC principally to obtain diffusion in control, i.e., separate ownership of the outlets
within the community. 42 This objective served both the public and first
37. Id.
38. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1964).
39. Id. § 304.

40. The FCC also noted that in its consideration of the licensee's performance,
questions relative to serious operational deficiencies would be explored in the hearing

process.

Facts once established could result in "demerits" against the renewal appli-

cant. It seems that a demerit would then be considered within the public interest
judgment of substantial service. Thus, the incumbent licensee with demerits would
not be competing with the challenger, but would be judged within the issue of substantial

performance.

The FCC cited examples of operational deficiencies "such as rigged

quizzes, violations of the Fairness Doctrine, over-commercialization, broadcast of lotteries, violation of racial discrimination rules, or fraudulent practices as to advertisers

.. " 1970 Policy Statement 3.
41. For example, after the policy statement the FCC amended their duopoly rules
so that the rules now prohibit the common ownership of the same broadcast service
(AM, FM or TV) where the contour of one encompasses the entire community of the
other. FCC PUBLIC NOTICE, Apr. 6, 1970 (FCC 70-310).
[hereinafter cited as
Amended Duopoly Rules].
42. In its analysis of the basis and purpose of the amended duopoly rules, the FCC
states that "the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public."
Amended Duopoly
Rules 5, quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
This
principle, together with the desire to prevent undue economic concentration, forms the

basis of all policies regarding diversification in the media. The FCC, however, reasons
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amendment interests. 43 Another purpose for examining diversification is the
FCC's stated objective of maximizing the program sources and viewpoints
available to the community. 44 After the 1970 Policy Statement, the FCC provided administrative regulations to achieve diffusion in control; but a challenger can no longer gain preference by showing that he will better diversify
program sources and viewpoints. By removing this competition, the goal of
maximizing the available program sources and viewpoints can be attained only
by the governing and imposing of set standards in television broadcasting by
45
the FCC itself.

Prior to the 1970 Policy Statement, the second criterion, owner-management integration, and the concomitant concern for community control, was
thought desirable and was preferred. 46 Today, however, owner-management
integration, i.e., ownership of the station and its effect on the service provided,
that the "key" to the public interest need for "diverse and antagonistic sources" lies in
the separation of sources within the area served. The operations of the television
industry indicate that mere separation of program sources will be ineffective to attain
diversification. See notes 51-56 infra and accompanying text.
43. Congress has repeatedly expressed its concern for limited ownership of communications media. Congressman Luther A. Johnson's remarks prior to the passage of
the 1927 Radio Act are representative of this concern:
There is no agency so fraught with possibilities for service of good or evil to
the American people as the radio .

. .

.

[I]t has limitless possibilities.

The

power of the press will not be comparable to that of broadcasting stations when
the industry is fully developed. . . . They can mold and crystallize sentiment
as no agency in the past has been able to do. If the strong arm of the law
does not prevent monopoly ownership and make discrimination by such stations
illegal, American thought and American politics will be largely at the mercy
of those who operate these stations.
67 CONG. REC. 5558 (1927). See also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395

U.S. 367 (1969).
44. Amended Duopoly Rules 2. The original duopoly rules were a qualifying
standard which set the minimum criteria for competing in the renewal process. Once
satisfied, a further question, i.e., whether for diversification purposes one applicant was
to be preferred over the other, had to be answered. The amended duopoly rules,
however, present a set standard for the existing licensees, which, once satisfied, removes the concept of diversity from comparison and competition. The FCC has reinforced diversity in its 1970 amendment to the duopoly rules: "The multiple ownership rules of the Commission have a two-fold objective: (1) fostering maximum competition in broadcasting, and (2) promoting diversification of programming sources and
viewpoints." Id. However, the 1970 Policy Statement when coupled with the rulemaking on multiple ownership effectively limits that concept of diversity.
45. Since administrative rules cover only diffusion in control, the FCC is now
required to set standards to maximize program sources and viewpoints. Likewise, the
FCC must insure that these standards are enforced. Competition is ideally suited to
that task. But the FCC in the 1970 Policy Statement has taken this burden upon itself
despite its obvious lack of qualifications.
46. In WBAL the FCC recognized that a preference for one applicant in diversification would raise a presumption that local ownership has a greater familiarity with the
needs and interests of the listeners. The question is not whether sixty rather than fifty
individual licensees will better serve the public interest, but rather the relevant determination is whether any of the licensees reflects the needs and interests of the community.

19701
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is subjugated to an administrative ruling of separate ownership. 4 I The determination that this standard of separate ownership will improve owner-management integration is not well founded.
The 1970 Policy Statement also dismisses from consideration the third
criterion, program proposals and their effect within the competitive system.
By dismissing this criterion, the FCC equates its own singular judgment of
the licensee's performance with that to be derived from the competitive
system. The challenged renewal applicant will still be subject to inquiry
and criticism, but comparisons and review of practical proposals have been
displaced.
Examined properly, each of these three criteria furthers what was, at least
theoretically, the FCC's understanding of how to insure broadcasting operations in the public interest. The effective removal of these criteria from
competitive examination destroys the impetus to challenge. Therefore, the
review of licensee performance should prove perfunctory at best. 48
The FCC's establishment of all encompassing rulings to replace applicable
criteria isolates the major change brought by the 1970 Policy Statement, i.e.,
49
the replacement of the FCC's judicial role by administrative rulings.
However, the competitive process under the Act can achieve the objective of service in the public interest. But before this can be shown, a determination of the proper goal for television broadcasting and an examination of the practical operation of the television broadcasting industry must
be made.
The Goal for Television Broadcasting
In the 1965 Policy Statement the primary focus was on competition between
mutually exclusive applicants. Examination of certain criteria as evidence
served to promote two primary goals, i.e., the best practical service to the
public and diversification in the media. Past programming of the renewal
applicant in WHDH, although a "critical" factor toward ascertaining future
performance, was accorded an evidentiary weight equivalent to other comparative factors to reach these two goals.
47. The 1970 Policy Statement negates competition and leaves only the amended
duopoly rules to insure that the public interest is secured.
48. The challenge and the threat of it were factors that helped insure operation in
the public interest. The FCC cannot review the operations of stations without a con-

siderable increase in personnel and operating funds.

Now that competition, hereto-

fore an aid for the FCC's evaluation of operations in the broadcast industry, has been

removed, the FCC has simply increased its workload.

Since its staff and facilities

are admittedly inadequate, the process of review will be superficial.

See note 26 supra.

49. Although the FCC is not vested with the power of a court, its methods of
operation are like those of a court. The FCC conducts hearings, listens to evidence, and makes judgments based upon the presentations in those hearings.
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This comparative process advocated by the FCC in WHDH comes close to
the proper regulatory function of license renewal proceedings. It admits that
the FCC is the representative public owner, establishes the licensee as an
applicant, recognizes the applicants on a equal basis as competitors, and most
importantly, identifies implicitly the proper goal for television broadcasting,
i.e., local programming.
However, WHDH failed to discern and articulate clearly the purposes to
be served by the renewal process under the statutory authority. The FCC's
simple adoption, in WHDH, of the goals and criteria applicable to initial applications was wrong. There are obvious differences between initial and
renewal applications and these differences suggest the fault of WHDH, i.e.,
the failure of the FCC to grasp a separate identifiable goal for renewal applicants within the comparative process.
The regulatory goal for television broadcasting is stated in the 1970 Policy
Statement:
the public interest standard is served, we believe, by policies which
insure that the needs and interests of the . . . viewing public will

be amply served by the community's local broadcast outlets. 50
The word "local" identifies the type of service in television broadcasting
which should be of primary concern in the renewal procedure. In television
broadcasting, "local" means programming oriented toward the particular
community served by the television station. But, the practicality of "local"
programming can be determined only after investigating the operations and
motivations of the television industry.
The Television BroadcastingIndustry
Depending on its location a television station serves a varying number of
people and different types of communities. The FCC has long recognized
that service in the public interest basically requires programming oriented
toward these communities.51 But the actual manner in which stations oper50. 1970 Policy Statement 1 (emphasis added).
51. The FCC has stated the obligation of the licensees in this manner: "[they must]
take the necessary steps to inform themselves of the real needs and interests of the
areas they serve, and to provide programming which in fact constitutes a diligent effort,
in good faith, to provide for those needs and interests." FCC PUBLIC NOTICE, July 29,
1960 (FCC 60-970).
Technical considerations had provided a system of locally based stations and the
concept of the public interest insured that broadcasting would be attentive to the specific needs and interests of the local community. An Oklahoma Case Study 8. In the
Matter of Primer on the Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants, FCC PUBLIC NOTICE, Dec. 19, 1969 (FCC 69-1402), the FCC goes into some

detail of the methods acceptable and the depth required in the station's ascertainment
of the needs and interests of the community and the station's responsibility to correct
the problems encountered.

Public Interest in License Renewals

1970]

ate belies much of the FCC's emphasis on local programming.
.As commercial services, television stations, particularly the VHF stations,
operate on an economically competitive basis within the confines of a community area. Their purpose, exclusive of the public interest control of the
FCC, is to maximize profits. 52 These profits are the results of the quantity
of advertising sold. Advertisers pay considerable amounts to finance both
the programming offered and the individual stations. These amounts are
relative to the size of the audience. Therefore, the character of a station's
programming and the type and size of its audience reflect the program's use
as a marketable item.
In the television broadcasting field the majority of programs are either
network or syndicate produced and in the commercially competitive VHF
spectrum the stations are either network affiliated or independent. The network stations are given a percentage of the advertising for programming the
network produced shows. Independent stations contract on an individual
basis for the shows offered by the networks or syndicates and solicit the
sponsors themselves. 53 Whether network or syndicate produced, the programs available to the individual stations are limited in type and quality.
Individual broadcasters rely primarily on these two sources since they cannot economically produce programs capable of competing for the available
mass audiences. 54 Therefore, economic competition has brought about the
dominance of network and syndicate programming which essentially reduces
the station's performance to a task of program selection. 55
One commentator has observed that this process of program selection from
the networks and syndicates has resulted in the mass production of a few
basic types of entertainment shows. This process severely limits the control
of national news and public affairs, and generally excuses the station's obligation of performance in the public interest.5 6 Thus, economic competition has
forced the utilization and eventual dominance of network programs which
are designed not to serve the needs and interests of the local community, but
to satisfy the need for nationally marketable programs of mass audience appeal.
This competition also affects the types of programs offered at particular
times. At prime time, when the potential for profit is at a maximum, virtually all the stations offer network or syndicate programming in order to at52. See Barrow, The Attainment of Balanced Program Service in Television, 52
U. VA. L. REv. 633 (1966).

53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 640.
Id. at 640-41.
Id.
Id. at 634-44.
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tract the greatest possible viewing audience. The programs which are locally
oriented tend to be relegated to time slots of low audience capacity. This
subordination of locally oriented programs further disserves the station's public function to respond to the needs and interests of the community. However, the FCC within its regulatory capacity under the statute can still achieve
the goal of local programming.
The FCC's Regulatory Process and the Proper Goal
The problems presented in the operation of television stations severely test
the regulatory purpose of the Communications Act of 1934. 57 The actual
operation of the individual stations belies the FCC's concern that past performance be the sole criteria at renewal. The examination of the television
broadcasting industry has shown that a station's concern for locally oriented
programming is minimal.
The comparative hearing is within the limits of the FCC's authority and is
a valid method of attaining the proper goal of the best practical service to the
local community. The high cost, the time involved, and the FCC's strict
ascertainment of qualifications for renewal applicants in the comparative
hearing all work toward narrowing the possible applicants to those most qualified and competent in the broadcasting field. In this comparative hearing the
FCC analyzes the licensee's past performance and the challenger's qualifications for the license. Minimally, this analysis requires a complete survey of
the needs and interests of the community to be served, and a detailed presentation of the programming proposed by the applicant. The comparative renewal process also guards the renewal licensee from undue harassment. The
challenger must post a construction bond for the facilities of the station and
prove capable of sustaining its total operational expenses for one year without
considering possible profits. 58 Moreover, the rigid qualification standards for
challenging a renewal license and the experience of the hearing examiners
have enabled the FCC readily to discern between possible performance
and so called "blue sky" programming proposals.
However, the FCC, even in the light of these protections, reasoned that
the predictability and stability of the industry was threatened by the comparative hearing. 9 In the 1970 Policy Statement the FCC stated that "[t]he in57. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1964).
58. FCC Form 301 (adopted April 1969).
59. See $3 Billion in Stations Down the Drain?, BROADCASTING, Feb. 3, 1969, at 19.
Professor Jaffe commented that WHDH represents a regulatory approach which is deficient as a means of improving programming and which gives insufficient protection to
the legitimate reliance interest of the broadcasters. He advocates different methods of
regulation which he suggests would be substantially more effective and would not

threaten the financial stability of the industry. Essentially, he recommends the estab-

1970]

Public Interest in License Renewals

stitution of a broadcast service requires a substantial investment, particularly
in television, and even where the investment is small it is likely to be relatively
large to the person making it.'6O But the profits realized by individual sta-

tions over a three-year license period raise the question whether the predictability and stability of the industry is actually threatened by the comparative
hearing. 61 It can reasonably be calculated from the FCC annual reports
that the average profit over the three-year license period is a 100 percent
return on the licensee's facilities investment. The 50 largest VHF stations,
which serve over 70 percent of the population, have a particularly healthy
return on their investment. 62 The process of acquiring broadcast facilities
in either initial applications or transfers normally prevents a station from depreciating in value. The value of the facility increases two to three times
its assets upon the granting of a license because of the value of the license
itself and the expected profit return over the license period.6 3 Therefore, the

investment of the individual licensee who has purchased broadcasting facilities
after an initial application cannot be jeopardized in the renewal process by

the comparative hearing. Licensees who are challenged at renewal and who
have purchased stations by transfer take a larger risk.

That licensee might

64
lose some investment if successfully challenged at renewal.

The FCC could have dealt with the possibility of investment loss as a

problem to be resolved within the comparative renewal process. One resolution of this problem is that a challenger, if awarded the license on a competitive basis, would be required by the FCC to purchase the facilities for a fair
negotiated price. 65 Therefore, the comparative process can achieve the
lishment of minimum standards in program performance similar to those suggested by
Commissioners Cox and Johnson. He further hopes that the industry's current expansion into the areas of UHF TV, cable television, educational television, and pay TV
will alleviate the problems of program diversity posed by the dominance of the top
VHF stations and the networks. Jaffe, WHDH: The FCC and Broadcasting License
Renewals, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1693 (1969).
60. 1970 Policy Statement 2.
61. Of 452 VHF television stations only 65 reported a loss. 122 reported profits in
excess of 1 million dollars. However, on the loss side, only seven stations reported
losses in excess of $400,000, 35 FCC ANN. REP. 136 (1969).
62. Id. at 133-43. As of Dec. 31, 1968, 642 VHF and UHF television stations had
invested $1,306,790,000 in tangible broadcast property. Therefore, the average investment per station is approximately two million dollars. The income for these same
stations in 1968 was $494.8 million, in 1967 was $414.6 million, in 1966 was $492.9
million. Id. at 138. Over the three-year period the average income for the 642 television stations per station was $2.2 million. Id. at 135.
63. See note 62 supra.
64. The transfer licensee may not have the benefit of an entire three year license
term, and for that reason his profits may not account for the initial investment.
65. See, e.g., Biscayne Television Corp., 33 F.C.C. 851 (1962) where the FCC ordered that the new licensee would have to reimburse the displaced former licensee
for the value of its transmitter and plant.
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proper goal for the television broadcasting industry, without jeopardizing the
stability and predictability of the industry.
Conclusion
The 1970 Policy Statement, which endeavors to protect the stability and predictability of the television industry, breaches the FCC's statutory authority.
By providing for renewal of licenses after a determination that the past performance of the licensee was "substantially attuned" to the needs and interests of the community, the FCC essentially negates the right to challenge
at renewal. Contrary to FCC statements, the 1970 policy will not insure the
standard of public interest but will foster operation to secure the greatest
profit. The proper public interest goal for the television industry is local
programming. This goal can be achieved without endangering the stability and predictability of the broadcast industry by a comparative process
within the statutory limits.
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